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Prasanna1
Staff
Staff
August 12, 2020

HUNTS- Rundll32 (T1085)

  • August 12, 2020
  • 0 replies
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HUNTS- Rundll32 (T1085)

Version 1.0


ATT&CK Technique: Rundll32 (T1085)


What this playbook hunts for:

  • Processes spawned by Rundll32.exe where the executable does not reside in a standard directory. Rundll32.exe can be used to execute malicious code. Rundll32.exe is an example of a Living of the Land (LOL) binary, which are native Windows executables that are rarely blocked by Applocker or anti-virus software.


How the playbook works:

  • Generates SIEM query for Sysmon Event ID 1 logs where Rundll32.exe is a parent process of an executable that does not reside in a standard folder


What results are expected:

  • Name, process ID, and path of the process spawned by Rundll32.exe

  • Command line arguments for Rundll32.exe

  • MD5 hash of the process spawned by Rundll32.exe

  • Child process spawn time

  • Hostname of the computer where Rundll32.exe was executed

  • User account that was used to execute Rundll32.exe


Common follow-on actions:

  • Acquire forensic image

  • Sandbox file

  • Get running processes

  • Get network connections

  • Quarantine host


What inputs are necessary:

  • SIEM

  • Logs: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation

  • Hunt start time


What subroutine playbooks are needed:

  • Create and Link Alerts from Hunt (Host-based)


What configurations are needed:

  • Sysmon logging enabled 


False Positive Potential: Medium to High

  • Depending upon the organization’s policies regarding execution of files outside of Windows directories and Program Files, execution of files with Rundll32.exe as a parent process may be relatively common. In these instances, extensive whitelisting should be applied prior to executing this playbook.