HUNTS- Regsvcs/Regasm (T1121)
HUNTS- Regsvcs/Regasm (T1121)
Version 1.0
ATT&CK Technique: Regsvcs/Regasm (T1121)
What this playbook hunts for:
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Processes spawned by Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe. Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe can be used to register COM objects and execute malicious code. Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe are examples of a Living of the Land (LOL) binary, which are native Windows executables that are rarely blocked by Applocker or anti-virus software.
How the playbook works:
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Generates SIEM query for Sysmon Event ID 1 logs where Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe are invoked with a .DLL file in the command line
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Generates SIEM query for Sysmon Event ID 1 logs where Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe are a parent process
What results are expected:
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Name, process ID, and path of the process spawned by Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe
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Command line arguments for Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe
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MD5 hash of the process spawned by Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe
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Child process spawn time
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Hostname of the computer where Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe was executed
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User account that was used to execute Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe
Common follow-on actions:
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Acquire forensic image
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Sandbox file
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Get running processes
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Get network connections
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Quarantine host
What inputs are necessary:
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SIEM
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Logs: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation
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Hunt start time
What subroutine playbooks are needed:
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Create and Link Alerts from Hunt (Host-based)
What configurations are needed:
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Sysmon logging enabled
False Positive Potential: Low
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Execution of Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe is uncommon on most networks. Child processes spawned by Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe are even more uncommon and should absolutely be investigated if observed.
